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Nicholas Dixon has organized his paper, "AUtilitarian 
Argument for Vegetarianism," around the positions for 
and against vegetarianism that are derived from the two 
main currents of traditional ethical theories-
utilitarianism and some variant of a rights-based 
approach. These currents are reflected in the work of 
Peter Singer and Tom Regan, respectively and are taken 
up by many others who write in the area. It is easy to 
understand why, in the context of his project of 
providing a utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, he 
chooses to limit the discussion to the two groups he 
addresses-utilitarianism and "human supremacism." 
Yet, it leaves out an entire area of recent deliberation 
and debate concerning the moral imperative of 
vegetarianism, that which is presented in contemporary 
ecofeminist thought. This is an area which deserves 
consideration, and not only for reasons of compre-
hensiveness, representation and inclusivity. It deserves 
consideration, also, and perhaps more importantly, 
because the issues addressed and points made by 
feminist writers on the topic speak directly to the need 
to combine "private decision with political action."2 
I wish to focus instead on a third set of arguments 
that can provide-on some variants-the basis for 
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support for vegetarianism as well as a critical 
perspective on the positions taken by adherents of 
traditional ethical theories. Feminist approaches to the 
issue enable one to explore the relationship between 
theory and practice in our moral lives; indeed, they 
require one to address the question of connections 
between theory and practice. Ultimately as with all 
complex and sophisticated ethical theories, it has to be 
said that the introduction of feminist theorizing into 
the topic of vegetarianism does not lead to easy 
answers or simple remedies. It is both intellectually 
interesting and practically significant that just as one 
can find utilitarian arguments both for and against 
vegetarianism and rights-based arguments both for and 
against vegetarianism, there are a range of possible 
feminist positions on vegetarianism. 
There are many reasons for addressing the topic of 
vegetarianism from a feminist, or rather from feminist 
perspectives.3 For one thing, a remarkable proportion 
of the increasing number of vegetarians are women.4 
The emphasis in much feminist literature in ethics on 
the connection between life experience and values 
makes it worth examining the gender dimension of the 
so-called "vegetarian option."5 Further, a significant 
amount of recent writing on vegetarianism, in particular, 
has been produced by feminists, and there have been 
several very prominent and influential ecofeminist 
treatments of the issue which make the case for the 
necessity of the connection.6 Popular literature on 
animal rights and vegetarianism often seems to assume 
that there is a simple and easy case to be made for allying 
feminism with vegetarianism. Carol Adams puts it 
succinctly and forcefully when she implies that the 
"values and beliefs imbedded in the choice to eat 
animals are antithetical to feminism."? 
Recent articles, nevertheless, have touched on the 
tensions within feminist circles about the issue of 
endorsing vegan, or even vegetarian conferences and 
events.s Ecofeminists, specifically, contend that "in 
the case of meat eating, the personal is political"; yet, 
not all feminists accept Ulis.9 Some feminists have 
even suggested that efforts to endorse vegetarianism 
are tantamount to cultural imperialism, and have the 
effect of undermining cultural traditions, in particular 
those of women of color. lo Thus, some feminists are 
likely to feel a reluctance to advocate vegetarianism 
for several reasons: in order to avoid the accusation 
of cultural imperialism, out of deference to cultural 
traditions, and not wanting to be perceived as 
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infringing on women's rights to choose. Some feminist 
theorists reject the claims of animal rights theory on 
other theoretical grounds. 
It might be helpful at this point to distinguish two 
disparate approaches to feminist ethics: one based on a 
"care ethic" and one based on an "anti-domination 
ethic."u The former is derived from, and developed 
out of the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose 
book In A Different Voice is widely read and whose 
ideas have become extremely influential. The latter can 
be found in the work of feminist theorists such as Carol 
Adams, Karen Warren, Lori Gruen and Kathryn Paxton 
George, among others. Simply put, the care ethic 
emphasizes the importance of relationships and 
emotional connections between beings, and the anti-
domination ethic advocates the "elimination ofany and 
all factors that contribute to the continued and 
systematic domination or subordination of women."12 
What I hope to show in this paper is that there is no 
neat and tidy relation between a particular approach to 
ethics and a stance on the moral imperative of 
vegetarianism. Some people think that a care ethic will 
support, or even require vegetarianism, others do not. 
And similarly, some people think that an anti-
domination ethic will support, or even require 
vegetarianism, but others do not. The importance of an 
exploration of feminist perspectives on vegetarianism, 
I argue, does not reside in whether or not the approach 
will produce the "right answer." The importance lies 
instead in the approach taken to moral reasoning. 
I will first discuss the claims made by Nell Noddings 
on behalf of a variant of care ethic and the positions 
she takes on human obligations towards animals derived 
from that ethic. She finds that the development of her 
ethical perspective does not dovetail with the approach 
taken by ecofeminists and others. Next, I will examine 
the positions advocated by adherents of variants of an 
anti-domination ethic. I will first address those theorists 
who argue for an integral connection between feminism 
and vegetarianism. I will then look at the analysis 
presented by Kathryn Paxton George, who takes an anti-
domination approach but explicitly critiques the 
arguments of traditional ethical theory in favour of the 
"vegan ideal." It is clearly worth exploring why some 
feminists think vegetarianism is morally obligatory and 
others don't. It is also worth speculating on the 
implications of their approaches to moral reasoning, 
on their views about how moral thinking and feeling 
should proceed. 
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The care ethic is premised a "mode of thinking that is 
contextual and narrative rather than formal and 
abstract."13 Gilligan proposes that there is a different 
moral voice, one which tends to be articulated by 
women and tends to be empirically associated with 
women. This different moral voice is concerned with 
care and responsibility rather than with the focus of the 
dominant moral voice-rights and justice. The 
dominant moral voice, Gilligan claims, tends to be 
articulated by men and tends to be empirically 
associated with men. The ethic ofcare is thus contrasted 
with the ethic of rights and justice. In passing, I would 
like to point out that Gilligan sometimes writes as if 
one could simply combine utilitarianism and a 
deontological or rights-based approach to ethics in one 
position. Other authors, such as Josephine Donovan, 
who write about "animal rights theory" tend to use this 
term to cover both utilitarian and rights-based 
approaches. Needless to say, moral philosophers would 
resist this lumping and fmd it unhelpful at best. 
Nell Noddings' book Caring: A Feminine Approach 
to Ethics and Moral Education contains a chapter titled 
"Caring for Animals, Plants, Things and Ideas." In a 
passage in that chapter, Noddings makes clear that her 
"caring" ethic extends only to humans and that her 
approach to ethics would not result in a judgmental 
stance against raising animals for food, eating meat or 
other human uses of animals (sealing, hunting, fishing 
etc.). She says positive things about keeping pets, in 
part because of the benefits to humans in so doing. 
Similarly, spiders, toads and snakes are welcome in the 
garden due to their usefulness. As for rats, she says she 
would not torture a rat, and she would hesitate to use 
poisons on one, but she "would shoot it cleanly if the 
opportunity arose."14 Thus, her approach is really quite 
anthropocentric, a fact which she does not Lry to deny. 
Noddings, ultimately, does not accept the interpretation 
of speciesism found in animal rights theory. She says 
instead that "[i]t is not "speciesism" to respond 
differently to different species if the very form of 
response is species specific."15 
It is necessary to set her remarks in context in order 
to understand why she takes the position she does. For 
Noddings, primary moral obligation is located in the 
domain of human life. The ethical impulse or attitude, 
she says, is grounded in the caring relation. Caring, in 
tum, depends upon past experience and conscious 
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choice.16 Caring is anchored in recognition ofrelations. 
Furthermore, our obligation to summon the caring 
attitude is limited by the possibility of reciprocityP 
Obligation, then, can only arise on encounter. IS As 
responsiveness or perceived responsiveness increases 
in the potential to be cared-for being, then so does caring. 
What this means for animals is that affection for 
animals varies greatly across persons. Some people will 
have had past experiences---encounters with certain 
animals and they will choose to undertake a commit-
ment to that being. Such is the reason that Noddings 
herself perceives an obligation to her family pet, a cat 
who appears expectantly, stretches its neck, and 
vocalizes its need. 19 In response, Noddings feels 
obligated to that particular animal, and perhaps to others 
of its kind she encounters. But the obligation does not 
extend any further, and certainly not to animals in 
general. For Noddings, one cannot be obligated to the 
entire class of animals.20 
Of course, other people will not have had past 
experiences or encounters with animals, nor will they 
choose to undertake any commitments to animals. In 
that case, they can hardly be said to have an obligation 
to any particular beings, on Noddings' account. They 
can be expected to avoid inflicting pain, since the one 
thing that Noddings' approach does require is that we 
must not inflict pain without justification. One must 
act to "prevent pain to consciousness, even the 
nonreflective consciousness of animals."21 According 
to Noddings, when the form ofresponse of the being in 
question permits detection ofpain, then we as caregivers 
are obligated to relieve it. Noddings' version of a care 
ethic, then, seems to provide a rationale for a minimal 
obligation to refrain from inflicting pain upon animals, 
although even that may be qualified.22 It does not give 
rise to further obligations to promote the welfare of 
animals, except insofar as particular caregivers choose 
to undertake a commitment to care for particular 
animals. It would not lead to judgmental stances 
prohibiting meat eating or the raising of animals for 
food or other reasons. 
I do not want to dwell on a discussion of the "care 
ethic," since I think that most arguments for 
vegetarianism that rest upon a feminist ethic depend 
upon the anti-domination version of feminist ethics. In 
addition, as I have already mentioned, at least one 
proponent of the care ethic version of feminist ethics-
namely Nell Noddings-explicitly rejects the idea that 
the care ethic entails support for vegetarianism. 
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Donovan actually tries to combine elements ofboth the 
care ethic and the anti-domination ethic approaches to 
feminist ethics. I will now go on to discuss the anti-
domination versions of feminist ethics. 
ill 
In an article entitled "Animal Rights and Feminist 
Theory," Josephine Donovan sets out the case for a 
feminist or feminine ethic to address the issue of the 
ethical treatment of animals. She claims that it is 
necessary to ground an ethic of concern for animals 
in what she calls "an emotional and spiritual 
conversation with nonhuman life-forms." She finds 
both utilitarianism and rights theories to be inadequate 
for this purpose, primarily due to the insistence ofmale 
moral philosophers that their positions are rooted in 
reason and not emotion. 
Donovan quotes Peter Singer's preface to Animal 
Liberation in which he recounts an anecdote about a 
visit to the home of a woman who claimed to love 
animals but who ate meat. He writes: " ....certainly she 
was keen to talk about animals. 'I do love animals', she 
began... and she was off. She paused while refresh-
ments were served, took a ham sandwich, and then 
asked us what pets we had."23 Donovan says that 
Singer's point "is not only to condemn the woman's 
hypocrisy in claiming to love animals while she was 
eating meat but also to dissociate himself from a 
sentimentalist approach to animal welfare."24 Singer 
then goes on to profess that he and his wife were not 
particularly interested in, nor fond ofanimals, that they 
did not 'love' animals. He says that the "portrayal of 
those who protest against cruelty to animals as 
sentimental, emotional 'animal lovers' [has meant] 
excluding the entire issue... from serious political and 
moral discussion."25 Donovan takes Singer to be 
assuming that associating the cause of animal rights 
"with 'womanish' sentiment is to trivialize it."26 
Donovan goes on to propose that women animal 
rights theorists-here she includes people like Mary 
Midgley (author ofAnimals and Why They Matter) and 
Constantia Salamone (an activist)-bave been able to 
develop theories which acknowledge and emphasize the 
importance of emotional bonding with animals. 
Midgley, for example, talks about the social and 
emotional complexity of animals and says: "[w]hat 
makes our fellow beings entitled to basic consideration 
is surely not intellectual capacity but emotional 
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fellowship."27 Salamone and other activists adopt a 
more explicitly feminist stance and condemn the 
"rationalist, rnasculinist bias of current animal rights 
theory," according to Donovan.28 
There are at least two ways in which emotion and 
emotional fellowship between humans and nonhuman 
animals could be relevant to the discussion of the ethical 
treatment of animals. One way in which it could be 
relevant is in providing reasons to treat animals with 
kinship. Thus, the biological affrnity between humans 
and other animals could be seen to be at least partial 
justification for treating animals with equal concern and 
respect. If this is the intended interpretation, then the 
feminist position would simply echo the utilitarian 
position fIrst formulated by Jeremy Bentham, who said 
"[t]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they suffer?"29 
I would argue that this is not the import of feminist 
approaches presented by Donovan and others. 
Recognition of sentience or the capacity for suffering 
or enjoyment does not distinguish feminist approaches 
from utilitarian approaches. The issue that arises from 
the application offeminism to the question of the ethical 
treatment ofanimals is the role of emotion in the process 
of ethical reasoning. I take Donovan's critical point to 
be that a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals is 
one that emerges out of "women's relational culture of 
caring and attentive love."3o She implies, then, that 
moral reasoning should attend to this culture and should 
incorporate a sensitivity to the affective dimension of 
our (meaning us humans) relations with animals as well 
as with each other.31 
Carol Adams uses the phrase "traffIc in animals" as 
a parallel to the term "traffIc in women" to suggest the 
parallels. Lori Gruen emphasizes the social construction 
of the connection between women and animals, a 
connection created by patriarchy as a means of 
oppression. She says that "ecofeminists are committed 
to a reexamination and rejection of all forms of 
domination.'032 She refers to the work of Karen Warren 
during the elaboration of her anti-domination ethical 
perspective. Karen Warren, in "The Power and Promise 
ofEcological Feminism," presents a critique of the role 
of conceptual frameworks in the logic of domination, a 
logic which has justified both the domination of nature 
and women by men. 
Warren argues that there are several significant 
features ofoppressive conceptual frameworks including 
value dualisms and logic of domination. 33 Value 
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dualisms are disjunctive pairs which are seen as 
oppositional and exclusive and which place higher 
status, prestige and value on one disjunct rather than 
another. Examples include: mindlbody, reason/emotion, 
male/female. A logic of domination is a structure of 
argumentation which leads to a justification of 
subordination. The justification rests on the grounds of 
characteristics-for example, rationality-which 
allegedly the dominant (e.g., men) have and the 
subordinate (e.g., women and nonhuman animals) 
supposedly lack. 34 
Warren argues that ecofeminisrn "involves an ethical 
shift from granting moral consideration to nonhumans 
exclusively on the grounds of some similarity they share 
with humans (e.g., rationality, interests, moral agency, 
sentiency, right-holder statuS).',35 Warren implies that 
the shift is toward an approach which provides a 
contextual account, one which has several significant 
features: it "makes a central place for values of care, 
love, friendship, trust and appropriate reciprocity" and 
it "involves a reconception of what it means to be 
human, and in what human ethical behavior consists."36 
As with Donovan, it seems as if elements from the care 
ethic and the anti-domination ethic are being merged 
and combined. 
IV 
There is yet another feminist perspective on vegetar-
ianism and in particular, on the vegan ideal, which needs 
to be brought into the discussion, and that perspective 
can be found in the work of Kathryn Paxton George. 
George has taken a critical stance on the assumption 
that there is a simple connection between a feminist 
approach rooted in concern for social justice and the 
universalist prescription in favor of ethical veganism 
based on traditional moral theory. George has asked 
the question "Should feminists be vegetarians?" and 
her answer seems to be "Not necessarily." She argues 
that the vegan ideal is actually discriminatory because 
the arguments for it "presuppose a 'male physiological 
norm' that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-
class males living in industrialized countries."37 
George's concern is that people who are not adult, 
middle-class males living in industrialized countries 
cannot be expected to adopt vegetarian and vegan diets 
for a whole series of reasons-having to do with 
ecology, economy and nutrition. These people would 
thus have to be excused from the duty to attain the virtue 
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associated with ethical lifestyles. As George puts it: "[i]f 
women, and infants, and children, and the elderly, and 
those who live almost everywhere else besides western 
societies are routinely excused for doing what would 
normally be considered wrong, in practice this relegates 
them to a nwral underclass of beings who, because of 
their natures or cultures, are not capable of being fully 
moral."38 This leads her to suggest that themoral tradition 
which has this implication is one which is designed to 
serve only the most privileged class of humans. 
The point that vegetarianism can be more easily 
realized by persons in industrialized countries has been 
made elsewhere. As Beardsworth and Keil put it: "[t]he 
conditions in which contemporary voluntary vegetar-
ianism can flourish are located not only in a cultural 
climate of nutritional pluralism. They also rest on the 
economic foundations ofan affiuent, consumer-oriented 
economy which can draw upon a vast array of food 
items, freed by the channels of international trade from 
the narrow limits of locality, climate and season."39 
George adds to this point a concern with the gender 
dimensions of the vegan ideal. 
The claim that George makes, based on these points, 
is that the traditional arguments for animal rights and 
animal welfare or liberation are tainted by bias. I do 
not want to enter into the debate concerning the accuracy 
of the nutritional literature on which George bases her 
critique-some of that debate can be found in Gary 
Varner's article "In Defence of the Vegan Ideal."4o 
Suffice it to say that George thinks her analysis is well 
grounded in contemporary scientific studies and 
analysis, but her critics disagree. 
I do want to suggest that George's critique has 
interesting implications for a utilitarian defense of 
vegetarianism. The critique would have some relevance 
for a reassessment of rights-based theories, but it is less 
clear what the implications would be. Certainly, 
consequentialist utilitarianism bas to take seriously the 
potential consequences of advocacy of universal 
vegetarianism and veganism. If there is sufficient 
substance to the claim that the vegan ideal is 
discriminatory due to the ecological, economic and 
nutritional factors outlined by George, then that has to 
be taken into account. Utilitarians need to consider the 
potential effects of their prescriptions on everyone 
concerned. It does seem somewhat arbitrary to limit 
the evaluation to only Western, industrialized societies. 
There has been an ongoing critique of environmental 
ethics generally, for its shortsightedness and 
ethnocentrism. It seems that George's work, if nothing 
else, has raised the concern that animal rights theory 
might have to address a similar critique. 
v 
Karen Warren's and Lori Gruen's ecofeminist 
perspectives on ethics would seem to lead to a position 
on the treatment of animals that converges with Carol 
Adam's position derived from feminist critical theory 
and feminist theology. They would all recommend 
vegetarianism as a feminist statement against patriarchal 
dominance. Josephine Donovan details the kinds of 
actions and policies concerning the treatment ofanimals 
that she thinks are entailed by the feminist rejection of 
either/or thinking, or epistemological dualism. She says 
feminists should reject the following: earnivorism, the 
killing of animals for clothing, hunting, the trapping of 
wildlife for fur, factory fanning, use of lab animals for 
testing of beauty and cleaning products, rodeos, and 
circuses. Feminists must work to abolish the "animal-
industrial complex," in other words.41 Additionally, 
feminists must support efforts to replace medical 
experiments by computer models and tissue culture and 
support the drastic redesigning of zoos. As she puts it; 
"[a]lI of these changes must be part of a feminist 
reconstruction of the world."42 
From the perspective of moral philosophy and the 
question of the choice of ethical theory, it is significant 
that the list of recommended actions and policies 
provided by Peter Singer or Tom Regan or other 
adherents of either utilitarian or rights-based theories 
would not differ significantly from that presented by 
Donovan. Thus, for many proponents of the anti-
domination ethic the prescriptive import of a feminist 
approach resembles that of traditional ethical theories, 
bllt the crucial difference lies in how one argues for 
those recommended actions or policies. 
Notes 
I This paper was initially titled "Feminist Arguments for 
and against Vegetarianism: Response to Nicholas Dixon's 'A 
Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism'." It was prepared for 
the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals sessions held 
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2 Nicholas Dixon, in his conclusion, acknowledges that 
Frey's admonitions to combine private decision with political 
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